Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) statement on highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in the Antarctic

The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is concerned about the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI, also known as bird flu) to the Antarctic region. The virus has now been detected in several bird and mammal species in sub-Antarctic islands and on the continent itself. HPAI clearly poses a grave threat to Antarctic wildlife. 

HPAI was most likely transmitted by birds migrating to the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic from South America, where it caused the deaths of thousands of birds and mammals. The virus can survive in low temperatures and in fresh water, and is likely to continue to spread throughout Antarctica via animal migration. Although HPAI can be contracted by humans, “the current strain does not appear to do so frequently, therefore the risk is considered to be low to moderate” (Source). Thus far, the impacts on birds and mammals in the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic are varied and unpredictable, making it difficult to predict how the virus will spread in the future. Nevertheless, it is likely to cause significant mortality in the coming years.

ASOC supports the biosecurity protocols and monitoring procedures put in place by expert organisations (see background information below). Following consultation with experts, ASOC additionally recommends the following actions to minimize the impact of HPAI in Antarctica, in accordance with scientific recommendations and the precautionary approach: 

• All visitors (including tourists, scientists, and support personnel) to the Antarctic should maintain rigorous compliance with the biosecurity protocols established by COMNAP, IAATO, and CCAMLR to avoid potentially spreading or being exposed to the virus. All operators should be familiar with the signs of HPAI infection and know where to report suspected cases (see https://scar.org/library-data/avian-flu). 
  
• All National Antarctic Programs (NAPs) should implement action plans (if they have not done so already) to deal with possible mass mortality events. 
  
• All Antarctic Treaty Parties should be prepared to take immediate precautionary action with regards to their own scientific stations and nationals as the situation may change quickly. This should include guidance for when activities such as scientific research and tourism should be suspended. 
  
• IAATO should continue to close sites where HPAI has been detected to its members, require member companies to survey landing sites thoroughly before allowing visitors to disembark on land in the presence of wildlife and continue to observe rigorous decontamination procedures between all landing sites regardless of whether HPAI has been detected. 
  
• Those working in the vicinity of or with wildlife should ensure they have appropriate personal protective equipment and maintain the best practices in HPAI biosecurity to prevent transmission between wildlife aggregations.
  
• Wildlife colonies should be carefully monitored for signs of HPAI before any humans approach, with a particular focus on skuas, gulls and giant petrels, since these species represent a high risk for HPAI transmission.
  
• National Antarctic Programs should undertake risk analysis assessments of all planned activities prior to the start of the 2024-2025 austral summer to determine if any activities need to be paused, particularly in areas where HPAI has already been detected or is suspected.  

The arrival of HPAI in Antarctica clearly demonstrates that Antarctica is not isolated from the rest of the world. Conversely, the rest of the world is not isolated from Antarctica. Although stopping the virus entirely might not be possible, implementing a highly precautionary approach such as that described above will ensure that human activities do not make the situation worse.  

Background information

While the presence of the virus in Antarctica may be unprecedented, HPAI itself is not new and there are well-established procedures for responding to outbreaks that have been adapted for the Antarctic context. There is already a robust network of organizations and experts dedicated to monitoring the virus and providing guidance on responding to outbreaks, including the World Organization on Animal Health (WOAH) and the OFFLU network. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) Antarctic Wildlife Health Network (AWHN) has been active in monitoring the outbreak, and SCAR has coordinated with the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) and the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) to share information on the virus, collate reports of potentially infected animals, and implement new biosecurity procedures, all in line with established best practice.